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Summary 
The rule of law crisis, which evolved into a detrimental to democratic standards process of changing the 
entire system of the state, has also deeply influenced the condition and functioning of the civil society 
sector. The gradual erosion of the checks and balances system accelerates the process of limiting the 
operational space and independence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This paper focuses on 
NGOs perceived as organisations independent from the state, working at the national or local levels in 
the public purpose, and whose role is to monitor the actions of the state (also known as watchdog 
organisations). The paper focuses on the effects of rule of law backsliding on the NGOs’ scope and 
methods of work, at the same time it shows how civil society organisations try to adjust to the changing 
reality. 
 
The rule of law crisis – the rule of law backsliding – the establishment of the new order 
of the state 
Respectively since 2010 and 2015, Hungary and Poland have been governed by two, quite 
similar parties. Both the Hungarian Fidesz and Polish Law and Justice are known for their 
Eurosceptic, right-wing and anti-migration polices. With wining the elections, both parties did 
not aim at carrying out the necessary changes of the state, but actually at creating a completely 
new political and legal state’s order. The chain of political and legal actions aimed at 
undermining the functioning of check and balance mechanisms as well as basics of the 
constitutional democracy started rule of law crisis which underpinned the years of these parties 
being in power.  
In his speech delivered in July 2014, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that the “Hungarian 
nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, 
strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal 
state, a non-liberal state”.1 His closest ally and de facto leader of Poland Jarosław Kaczyński has 
                                                     
1 Csaba Tóth, Full text of Viktor Orbán’s speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 2014, available at: 
https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/.  
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never tried to hide his fascination with Orbán’s politics. In 2011, after loosing the parliamentary 
elections, Kaczyński cheered his supporters with a declaration that “a day will come when we’ll 
have Budapest in Warsaw.”2 Although in theory both leaders aim at creating a similar order of 
the state, still their visions of this state may differ – it seems that in Hungary, the illiberal 
democracy may be just an abstract concept serving political purposes, while in Poland this 
notion may be used as a pretext for reclaiming the Polish sovereignty.  
As Petra Bard and Dimitry Kochenov described it “whereas Hungary is essentially a cleptocracy 
where the government may pick any ideology available on the political spectrum to acquire and 
retain economic and political powers, the Polish government and especially PiS leader, de facto 
ruler of Poland Jarosław Kaczyński are more likely to truly believe in what they are preaching in 
terms of national interests”.3 Another important difference is the formal legitimacy to initiate 
this process of change – although Fidesz won the Parliamentary elections in 2010 with a 
constitutional majority, still the Law and Justice did not gain the enough seats in the Parliament 
to change the Constitution (yet, it has to be stated that Law and Justice was the first since 1989 
party which won the Parliamentary elections with a simple majority). Also in 2018, after eight 
years in the government Fidesz has carried out numerous systemic changes that effectively 
reshaped the system of the state while in Poland still the process of installing the illiberal 
democracy is in progress.  
Despite these differences, at the operational stage both parties followed almost identical 
scenarios of consolidating power in their hands and putting the project of creating an illiberal 
democracy in motion. In both cases – Poland and Hungary – the process started with 
constitutional crises which, first and foremost, affected the position and independence of the 
Constitutional Court. When in 2010, Fidesz won the elections one of its first legislative and 
policy steps was addressed at this key institution of the state. Fidesz changed the process of 
appointing new judges of the Court and, in this way, secured its right to staff the Court with its 
own people. Five years later, in November 2015, the new Polish governing majority Law and 
Justice almost immediately after the elections started a similar attack on the Constitutional 
Tribunal.  
However, in this case the governing majority not only secured its right to appoint new judges 
of the Tribunal, but also disregarded the legal appointment of judges carried out by the 
previous governing majority. The constitutional courts in both countries not only played an 
important role in the mechanism of checks and balances, e.g. they have the competence to 
pronounce certain provisions as unconstitutional, but also they were key components of the 
human rights protection system. After the elections in 2010, the new governing majority 
                                                     
2 Tvn24.pl, "Przyjdzie dzień, że w Warszawie będzie Budapeszt”, available at: https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-
z-kraju,3/przyjdzie-dzien-ze-w-warszawie-bedzie-budapeszt,186922.html.  
3 Dimitry Kochenov, Petra Bárd, Against Overemphasizing Enforcement in the Current Crisis: EU Law and the Rule 
of Law in the (New) Member States, East European Politics and Society, forthcoming. 
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adopted significant changes to the functioning of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. First of 
all, the obligation that each nominee for the position Court’s judge had to be approved by the 
majority of the parliamentary parties and then accepted by a two-thirds majority was replaced 
by the obligation that the nominee should be accepted by the Parliamentary two-third 
majority.4 In a consequence, the former balance of different political views represented on the 
bench was violated. Secondly, the new Fundamental Law (which overruled the former 
Hungarian Constitution), increased the number of the Court’s judges (from 11 to 15) and their 
terms of offices were prolonged.5 Furthermore, in the Hungarian legal system, there used to 
be a mechanism of actio popularis (a legal possibility thanks to which anyone without having 
an actual case or controversy could turn to the Constitutional Court to verify in abstracto the 
constitutionality of a specific provision6). Actio popularis was a very popular tool for seeking the 
protection of human rights – the most important human rights related cases were decided in a 
result of these petitions and it is estimated that almost 1,600 cases were lodged to the Court.7 
The egalitarian nature of this complaint led to describing it as “a substitute for direct 
democracy.” 8  However, this mechanism was abolished by one of the reforms of 2012, 
provoking the observations that “(abolishing actio popularis was) just one of the indications of 
a radical move away from a democratic dimension in constitutionalism.”9 Furthermore, the 
adopted in 2013 Fourth Amendment introduced provisions hampering the independence of 
the Court among others it nullified all the decisions made by the Court in previous 20 years and 
it also removed „Court’s power to evaluate on substantive grounds any new constitutional 
amendments, a move which allows the government to escape review by inserting any 
controversial new proposal directly into the Constitution”.10 
In Poland, after the adoption within a year six different pieces of legislation concerning the 
works and structure of the Constitutional Tribunal, its independence has been severely 
undermined and its works have been visibly slowed down (e.g. by in 2017, the Tribunal issued 
88 decisions while in the same period in 2016 there were 99 decisions, in 2015 - 173 
                                                     
4 Petra Bárd, Trigger and test case for EU constitutionalism. Hungary’s Fundamental Law and related constitutional 
changes 2010–2013. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz, The Hungarian Constitutional Court in Transition - from Actio Popularis to Constitutional 
Complaint, available at: http://akademiai.com/doi/pdf/10.1556/AJur.53.2012.4.3. 
7 Ibidem. 
8 Wojciech Sadurski, Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Springer Netherlands, 2014. 
9 Ibidem. 
10 Kim Lane Scheppele, Statement, The trajectory of democracy - Why Hungary matters?, Joint House and Senate 
Hearing, 113 Congress, available at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113jhrg95506/html/CHRG-
113jhrg95506.htm.  
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decisions11). Furthermore, since 2017 serious doubts regarding the legal legitimacy of the 
Constitutional Tribunal have arisen as three persons appointed without a valid legal basis for 
the position of a judge were assigned cases. As a result, persons who do not have a 
constitutional mandate to rule on cases currently sit on the Constitutional Tribunal. This 
situation raises concerns whether the decisions issued by bench which included these three 
persons should be treated. The Constitution states that the Constitutional Tribunal’s 
judgements are final and binding and does not provide a mechanism for revoking them. This 
uncertainty is one of the key factors weakening the position of the Constitutional Tribunal in 
the Polish system of human rights protection. 
In both cases, the constitutional crisis has developed extremely fast, and soon evolved into a 
much more complex phenomenon, the so-called rule of law backsliding. The rule of law 
backsliding is described as “the process through which elected public authorities deliberately 
implement government blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate or capture 
internal checks on power with the review of dismantling the liberal democratic state and 
entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant party.” 12  The process of the rule of law 
backsliding reaches far beyond the issue of the independence of the Constitutional Court. As 
Ewa Łętowska described it in reference to Poland “the changes occurring since 2016 are 
characterised by rapid change of law swiftly followed by systemic change of state’s 
functioning”.13 
Both in Poland and Hungary, the governing majorities have introduced numerous changes 
widening political supervision over the justice system. For example, in both countries the 
position of the Prosecutor General has been strengthened in a way which limits its 
accountability and democratic oversight over the institution. In Poland the Prosecutor General 
is also the Minister of Justice and has competences to, among others, interfere with every single 
investigation, while in Hungary the Chief Public Prosecutor does not respond to the 
government or the parliament, and the MPs’ right to pose interpellations was abolished.14 
Furthermore, for both of these positions were assigned to persons loyal or affiliated to the 
governing majorities. 
                                                     
11 Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, Analiza działalności orzeczniczej Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w latach 2014-
2017, available at: http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Odpowiedzialne%20 
Panstwo/Raport%20ZEP%20o%20funkcjonowaniu%20TK.pdf.  
12 Laurent Pech, Kim Lane Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU, Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies, 2017, 3-47, 10. 
13 Ewa Łętowska, Zmierzch liberalnego państwa prawa Polsce, Human Rights Quarterly, Helsinki Foundation for 
Human Rights, No. 1-2, January-June 2017. 
14 Hungarian Helsinki Committee, The HHC, the HCLU and the Eötvös Károly Institute analysed the new laws on 
the court system and the Prosecution Service of Hungary, available at: http://www.helsinki.hu/en/analysis-court-
system-and-prosecution-service/.  
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Also, changes did not bypass the judiciary system and judges themselves. In 2011, the 
Hungarian Parliament lowered the retirement age of judges. As a result, all judges who had 
continued exercising their functions beyond the age of 62 were notified of their imminent 
retirement. It is estimated that this change affected almost 10% of judges.15 Then, it changed 
the composition of the Supreme Court and, by establishing the new institution of the National 
Judicial Office, altered the process of managing courts and appointing new judges. Again, the 
current Polish governing majority has been following a similar path and, since the beginning of 
2017, has been trying to carry out “reforms” of the justice system. The main aim of these 
reforms is to change the process of appointing new judges to be more dependent on the 
political will and to change the structure of the Supreme Court. In December 2017, the 
Parliament adopted amendments to the Act on the Supreme Court and the National Council of 
Judiciary in Poland which widened the political supervision over the highest top court in Poland 
and the administrative body which is supposed to protect the independence of judiciary. The 
Council is composed of among others 15 judges who used to be appointed be judges 
themselves. After the amendment, the Parliament appoints the judges-members of the 
Council. This change deeply influences the composition of the Council, but it may have impact 
on the process of appointing the new judges of the courts as the Council is responsible for 
carrying out this process. The Venice Commission in its opinion described the legislation as a 
“grave threat” that “puts at serious risk the independence of all parts of the Polish judiciary”.16 
Further changes concern, among others, media freedom – in both countries the governing 
majority managed to take control over the management of public media and put it under 
political control. As a consequence, the public media turned into a propaganda tool, they repeat 
the governments’ messages and enhance their rhetoric. Both governing majorities have 
adopted hostile polices towards migrants and refugees, decreased the level of human rights 
protection and completely disregarded any warnings from the international community.17  
The long list of similarities does not, however, end here. In both countries, the key reforms 
were adopted at the accelerated pace without a proper social consultation process. 
Furthermore, the governments of both countries, on a daily basis use similar, confrontational 
rhetoric aimed at specifically selected public enemies which include, among others, groups as 
opposition parties, judges, migrants and representatives of the civil society sector. This leads 
to further polarisation of the society and results in the petrification of the newly established 
order.  
                                                     
15 FIDH, Hungary: Democracy under threat. Six years of attacks against the rule of law, no. 684a, available at: 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/hungary_democracy_under_threat.pdf.  
16 Venice Commission, Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the 
Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the 
Organisation of Ordinary Courts, adopted by the Commission at its 113th Plenary Session (Venice, 8-9 December 
2017), available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)031-e.  
17 See further e.g. Freedom in the world 2017, Freedom House, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/ 
default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf or Human Rights Watch, Annual Report 2016, available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/wr2016_web.pdf.  
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In this context, the standing of the civil society and its development have not remained immune 
to these systemic changes. The rule of law backsliding embodied in the attacks on the judiciary, 
independent media and civil service et al. has a deep impact on limiting the operational space 
for the civil society in both countries. The mass changes in the entire system of the state have 
triggered dynamic processes of remodelling the civil society sphere and its organisations.  
“This isn’t just an issue of the rule of law crisis. This is a change in the whole system of the 
state and NGOs have to realize that they work in a new regime.” (S-HU-1) 
In this regard, the issue of how much the rule of law backsliding has hampered the work of civil 
society and how the organisations have responded to the new challenges relating to the 
process is an aspect of crucial importance. 
Civil society organizations and their role in the democratic state 
There is no one, widely accepted definition of the civil society. The definitions offered by 
academic literature vary from definition of an abstract nature, concentrating on the key aspects 
of the civil society, to those more pragmatic perceptions of the civil society, focusing on the key 
roles that the civil society has to play in a democratic state.  
For instance, civil society has been conceptualized as the “organized expression of society’s 
values, a sphere of freedom in which individuals come together for debate and advocacy or a 
system of networks linking individuals in their pursuit of influence over community and political 
affairs.”18 In terms of actors in this context, the concept of civil society would “include all those 
voluntary and non-profit organizations which play an important role in giving voice to the 
concerns of citizens and in delivering services that meet people’s needs.”19 
Maina Kiai, UN Special Rapporteur on peaceful assembly and associations, in his report of 2017 
adopted the definition of the civil society as “embodying ‘forms’ (diverse associational 
relationships), embracing ‘norms’ (values that shape the ‘good society’ such as freedom, 
democracy, tolerance, cooperation), and engaging in ‘spaces’ (the public sphere where 
discussions, contestations can freely take place to hopefully achieve agreement on what is good 
for society).”20 Wiktor Osiatyński, in turn, defined the civil society from the perspective of its 
relation to the entire state. In his opinion, the civil society is an autonomic subject able to 
counterbalance the state’s authority and allowing the society to manifest its interest and needs, 
unite around issues of common care and influence on the public decisions.21 In such a context, 
                                                     
18 Jocelyn Veteran, Emily Clough and Killian Clarke, Reclaiming the „Third sector” from „Civil Society”: A New 
Agenda for Development Studies, Sociology of Development, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015. 
19 Beate Kohler-Koch & Christine Quittkat (2009) What is civil society and who represents civil society in the EU?—
Results of an online survey among civil society experts, Policy and Society, 28:1, 11-22. 
20 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association, Maina Kiai, 23 May 2017, available at: http://freeassembly.net/reports/civil-society/.  
21 Wiktor Osiatyński, Republika obywateli, Warszawa, 2007. 
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civil society can also be defined as “a sphere of social interaction between economy, state and 
the intimate sphere, the sphere of associations, social movements and forms of public 
communication” and mobilization.22  
This wide spectrum of definitions of the civil society may cause, in practice, severe problems in 
defining whether an organisation claiming to represent its members or interests of the 
constituency actually can be perceived as a civil society organisation23. Regardless, however, of 
the differences in defining the civil society, it is unquestionable that the state ruled by law and 
founded on values of liberal democracy cannot function properly without a space for an 
independent development of activity carried out by citizens in the name of public interest. 
Usually, such a role is played by non-governmental organisations (also known as civil society 
organisations or – in cases concerning the monitoring of the authorities’ actions – watchdog 
organisations).   
This research paper focuses on a specific aspect of the organisation of the civil society which 
are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) perceived as independent from the state, working 
at the national or local level with any kind of public purpose, non-profit organisations whose 
role is to monitor the actions of the state. As with the concept of the civil society, the idea of a 
civil society organisation can be perceived from different perspectives and by applying different 
criteria (e.g. methods of work, target group and scope of their work). However, for the purpose 
of this research, the scope of the works of watchdog organisations should be investigated 
broadly, including not only monitoring of state authorities’ actions, but also strategic litigation, 
research and advocacy, as well as providing services to certain groups as these are the fields 
which may be most affected by the changes within the system of the state. Also, for the purpose 
of this paper, watchdog organisations are defined as organisations independent from the state 
providing to its members and supporters an opportunity to express their opinions and position 
regarding various public developments. Watchdog organisations can operate at both 
international and national levels.   
NGOs play a vital role in maintaining democracy and the state ruled by law. By their monitoring 
of the state’s actions, collecting data and evidence, together with the independent media and 
judiciary, they hold the governments accountable.24 Also, in post-communist countries such as 
Hungary and Poland, the NGOs established just after the collapse of the Berlin Wall helped in 
developing democratic standards and mainstreaming human rights in the general discourse.  
                                                     
22 Beate Kohler-Koch & Christine Quittkat (2009) What is civil society and who represents civil society in the EU?—
Results of an online survey among civil society experts, Policy and Society, 28:1, 11-22. 
23 For example political parties or churches have some characteristic features of the civil society organisations – 
they are created upon the initiative of the induvial persons or non-state authorities and represent the interests of 
their supporters, yet their agendas and spheres of work differ from the civil society organisations.  
24 See also: Israel Butler, Participatory democracy under threat: Growing restrictions on the freedom of NGOs in 
the EU, available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_W-Vna2eVNVOFk5VXUzeE9CdGM/view.  
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Furthermore, NGOs may also be representatives of different minority groups whose rights and 
freedoms are prone to violation by the state (in certain cases, civil society organisations can 
become an advocate of the rights of minority groups together with courts and ombudspersons 
may participate in the process of granting „the minorities ‘non-discrimination’ in effective 
access to rights, justice and democracy (…) Civil society organisations, and notably minority-led 
grass-roots organisations, can articulate the issues and challenges on the ground” 25 ). By 
providing legal aid, non-governmental organisations compensate for the deficiencies of state-
run systems of legal aid and protect the rights of these groups whose needs might have been 
excluded from the mainstream policies. As tools for changing the public life, NGOs also use 
strategic litigation (both at the national and international levels) and advocacy, which includes 
participation in the monitoring and review mechanisms established by international 
organisations such as the UN or the Council of Europe proving to be reliable partners 
administration, decision makers and stakeholders. Furthermore, NGOs could also play an 
important role in processes of mobilising the society and raising social pressure on the decision 
makers. 
Given their wide scope of operation and ability to influence the public opinion, NGOs could also 
be the key players in the process of resisting the rule of law backsliding. That is why, in both 
countries, NGOs has become yet another element that has to be changed in the process of 
creating the new order of the state.  
Shrinking civil society space as one of the consequences of the rule of law backsliding 
The rule of law backsliding has enhanced the process of the so-called shrinking civil society 
space. This term describes a situation in which the operational space for NGOs (understood as 
the capacity to function as an organization and perform their tasks) is being limited by the 
policies or legal amendments adopted by the government. 26  Some authors point at the 
repressive aspect of this phenomena, stating that “the term of shrinking civil society space can 
be understood as a concept or framework that captures the dynamic relationship between 
repressive methods and political struggle, including the ways in which political struggle 
responds to these methods to reclaim space, and the impact this response has upon how 
political struggles relate to one another”.27  
It is estimated that over the last several years, systemic violations of the freedom of assembly 
and association could be observed in several countries all over the world, leading to what 
                                                     
25 Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, Lina Vosyliūtė, Petra Bárd, Towards a Comprehensive EU Protection System for 
Minorities, Brussels: European Parliament (EP), 2017, p. 24, available at: https://www.ceps.eu/publications/ 
towards-comprehensive-eu-protection-system-minorities.  
26  Chris van der Borgh, Carolijn Terwindt, Shrinking operational space of NGOs - a framework of analysis, 
Development in Practice, Volume 22, no 8, November 2012. 
27  Semanur Karaman et.al, On “shrinking space” a framing paper, Issue brief shrinking space, Transnational 
Institute, April 2017. 
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became called a “global crackdown” on the civil society.28 During past four years, more than 60 
countries across the globe have passed or drafted laws that curtail the activity of non-
governmental and civil society organizations. Although the operational space for the civil 
society in many countries of the EU remains to a certain extent safeguarded, the research 
carried out by CIVICUS shows that the perception of the conditions of civic space has 
deteriorated since 2016.29   
It is difficult to create a comprehensive list of symptoms of shrinking civil society space. The 
symptoms may vary depending on the political context, legal framework and the stage of civil 
society development in each country. However, in general there are certain actions or policies 
which implemented separately or jointly can severely undermine the standing of NGOs and 
independency of their operational space. Among these actions are: administrative restrictions, 
stigmatisation of NGOs, limiting the space of dialogue, physical harassment and intimidation of 
civil society activists and criminalization of different forms of civil society engagement. 30 
Recently carried out studies (e.g. the report prepared by Fundamental Rights Agency in 2017) 
revealed some other negative trends that can also be analysed in the context of shrining civil 
society space – among them are limited capacity of civil society organizations which undermine 
their ability to work effectively or certain provisions that overburden NGOs with reporting and 
tax duties. 31  Furthermore, imposing restrictions for freedom of expression or freedom of 
assemblies as well as decreasing space for online activism or capturing the space traditionally 
inhabited by NGOs can also be recognized as elements of the trend of shrinking civil society 
space.32 
In the project of “illiberal democracy”, which both governments in Poland and Hungary try to 
implement, there is very little room for NGOs standing for values which are not shared by the 
governing majority (among these values, there are human rights, rights of minorities, equal 
treatment or the rule of law). Therefore, civil society organisations are targeted in the same 
way as other key components of the democratic state ruled by law, such as the judiciary or 
independent media. Both governing majorities have adopted policy and legal amendments that 
have hampered or will effectively hamper the works of NGOs. However, contrary to the pieces 
of legislation that concerned the key elements of the state (such as the judiciary or media), the 
                                                     
28 The Guardian, “Human rights groups face global crackdown ‚not seen in a generation’, 26 August 2015, available 
at: https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/aug/26/ngos-face-restrictions-laws-human-rights-generation.  
29  See further: CIVICS, Civic Space in Europe Survey, October 2016, available at: 
https://civilsocietyeuropedoteu.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/civicspaceineuropesurveyreport_2016.pdf.  
30  Chris van der Borgh, Carolijn Terwindt, Shrinking operational space of NGOs - a framework of analysis, 
Development in Practice, Volume 22, no 8, November 2012. 
31 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Challenges facing civil society organisations working on human 
rights in the EU, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/challenges-facing-civil-society-orgs-
human-rights-eu.  
32  Semanur Karaman et.al, On „shrinking space” a framing paper, Issue brief shrinking space, Transnational 
Institute, April 2017. 
10 | MAŁGORZATA SZULEKA 
 
changes regulating the operational space for NGOs have a rather evolving nature33 and seem 
to be a long-term strategy of silencing the civil society sector. Given the robust nature of the 
civil society sector as well as different types of civil initiatives, a complete limitation of the 
operational space for the civil society requires a systemic approach and coordinated actions. 
So far, it seems that both governing majority adopted strategies targeting certain selected 
NGOs with an exception to several cases in which they adopted some systemic changes.  
In Poland and Hungary, the most important symptoms of the shrinking civil society space could 
be observed: attacks on NGOs (including changing narration around NGOs), limiting space for 
social consultations and public debate and restrictions in access to funding.  
 
 
 
 
Changing narration around NGOs 
In times of rule of law crisis, the NGOs face an unprecedented amount of criticism and 
stigmatisation in the public discussion. Stigmatisation and smear campaigns build on its basis 
are „commonly used to delegitimize human rights defenders and undermine their work”.34 The 
main aim of such an orchestrated campaign is to deprive the NGOs, who used to be active in 
the public sphere, from their legitimacy to take part in e.g. decision making processes or public 
activity in the field relevant to their work. All of the Hungarian and Polish watchdog 
organisations’ activists interviewed for the purpose of this research pointed at the worsening 
atmosphere around their organisations and their work.  
                                                     
33 For example , in Poland, it took almost one year to adopt the law changing the process of distributing public 
funds for NGOs, while e.g. the laws changing the works of the Constitutional Tribunal or the first reform of public 
media were adopted at accelerated pace – from 3 up to 5 days. 
34  Amnesty International, Human Rights Defenders Under Threat - a shrining space for civil society, 
ACT/30/6011/2017. 
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“More and more often we’re asked questions like: who do you think you’re to interfere 
with the internal issues of Poland? What is your organisation doing? Why do you question 
the works of the government? Which foreign force inspires you?”. (S-PL-2) 
“The situation of the watchdog organisations in Hungary has been constantly worsening 
over the last couple of years. We’ve been observing how much the changing climate 
surrounding NGOs and portraying them as foreign agents and enemies have influenced our 
work.” (PL-HU-2) 
The change in the perception of NGOs is usually embodied in the official narration used by the 
governing majority and the public media, and then repeated in orchestrated and targeted 
smear campaigns. In all these instances, NGOs are usually presented as detached from reality, 
inspired by foreign governments or institutions, closely cooperating with political opposition. 
For example, in Hungary the anti-NGOs tone in the public rhetoric had been observed since 
Fidesz coming into power, however the full eruption of this narration started in 2014 with the 
infamous speech of Prime Minister Orban in which he described NGOs as “political activists 
paid by foreigners.”35 Later, this narration was combined with a campaign against a well-known 
philanthropist George Soros who supports numerous Hungarian NGOs. In 2017, within the 
national consultations on the “Soros Plan” run by the Hungarian government the NGOs 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee, one of the most prominent Hungarian organizations dealing 
with human rights protection, was directly mentioned in one of the questions and in a false 
context suggesting that the organization advocated for “lighter sentences for migrants for the 
crimes they commit”. In response to this, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee decided to sue the 
Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister.36 The case has not been finally decided yet. In February 
2018, the court of the first instance found that the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister had 
violated the Hungarian Helsinki Committee’s right to good reputation.37 
So far, in Poland, the aggressive rhetoric towards NGOs has not developed to such an extent. 
Since 2016, however, there have been several examples of orchestrated smear campaigns 
against certain NGOs. One of such examples is a campaign run by the public media in the main 
news programme “Wiadomości” in 2016 suggesting that one organisation, led among others 
by the daughter of the former President of Poland, allegedly received donation from the public 
funds operated by the local government due to her personal ties with the citiy office 
administration.38 The media reports were based on publicly available documents, yet still were 
                                                     
35 The Budapest Beacon, Full text of Viktor Orbán’s speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 2014, available 
at: https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/.  
36 Justin Spike, Hungarian Helsinki Committee sues propaganda ministry over National Consultation, available at: 
https://budapestbeacon.com/hungarian-helsinki-committee-sues-propaganda-ministry-national-consultation/.  
37 Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Helsinki Committee wins lawsuit against Cabinet Office over Stop Soros National 
Consultation, available at: https://www.helsinki.hu/en/hhc-wins-lawsuit-against-cabinet/.  
38 See further: Warso Z., Godzisz P. Bychawska-Siniarska D., Information on challenges faced by human rights 
defenders and civil society in Poland, November 2016, available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/HRD-report-30112016-FIN.pdf.  
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framed into a narration of an investigative journalism. The journalists by „revealing” the 
information on the financing of certain NGOs aimed at discrediting the activists and smear the 
work of their organizations. The National Broadcasting Council stated that the reports on NGOs 
“lacked information about the actual work of such organisations and their social role and also 
costs of their operations connected with the exercise of their statutory duties and involvement 
of NGO activists”.39 
Similar campaign targeted Akcja Demokracja, one of the leaders of the civil society’s massive 
protests against the reforms of the judiciary in 2017. The campaign run by the public media and 
far right press aimed at allegedly “uncovering” the sources of financing of the organisations (all 
information was publicly available at the organisation’s website) and suggesting that Akcja 
Demokracja implemented the priorities of the German government in Poland as two of its 
major donors have offices registered in Germany.40 
In some cases, the smear campaigns are followed by actions undertaken by law enforcements 
which may intensify the atmosphere of hostile environment for NGOs or even oppression. For 
example, in 2014, the Hungarian government started a campaign against the national operators 
of EEA/Norway Grants. The weeks of escalating tension related to audit controls and 
governmental accusations towards not only the operators of the grants, but also its 
beneficiaries, resulted in a police raid on Ökotárs office (one of the leading organisations in the 
NGOs consortium responsible for distribution of the grants). 41 Eventually, almost six months 
later the court found the police raid as a violation of the law.42  
Such actions may have a chilling effect not only on the targeted organisations, but also other 
organisations working in the similar fields. The smear campaigns combined with actions carried 
out by state authorities and entities aim at creating the image of “suspicious” organisations 
who may become an undesired partner for their donors and supporters.43 Furthermore, in case 
of organisations providing legal or psychological aid, such police raids may cause a chilling effect 
among their clients who seek aid offered in confidentiality and guaranteeing the protection of 
                                                     
39  Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Regulator responds to HFHR’s complaint about TV evening news 
programme, available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/en/regulator-responds-to-hfhrs-complaint-about-tv-evening-news-
programme/.  
40 Paweł Kośmiński, Akcja Demokracja broniła sądów. Teraz atakuje ją TVP, a poseł PiS donosi do prokuratury, 
Wyborcza.pl, 20 August 2017, available at: http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,22255187,akcja-demokracja-bronila-
sadow-teraz-atakuje-ja-tvp-a-posel.html.  
41 Hungarian Helsinki Committte et al, Timeline of governmental attacks against Hungarian NGO sphere, available 
at: https://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/timeline_of_gov_attacks_against_hu_ngos_07042017.pdf.  
42 Free Hungary, Court condemns police raid on independent NGO Ökotárs headquarter was illegal, available at: 
http://freehungary.hu/index.php/56-hirek/3589-court-condemns-police-raid-on-independent-ngo-oekotars-
headquarter-was-illegal.  
43 See also: Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Hungary must provide space for civil society, Policy Paper, no 1/2016, 
available at: http://nhc.no/filestore/Publikasjoner/Policy_Paper/2016/NHC_PolicyPaper_1_2016_Hungaryspace 
forcivilsociety.pdf.  
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personal data. Such actions, accompanied by media coverage, may lead to severe breach of 
public trust in these organisations. In a consequence, without carrying out systemic changes, 
certain NGOs may be pushed outside the mainstream of public life or may be forced to change 
the scope and methods of their work.  
Limited space for dialogue 
In both countries, with different frequency, yet very persistently, watchdog organisations are 
portrayed as an alien factor in the mechanism of the state. As a consequence, NGOs are not 
treated as a reliable partner for cooperation which is reflected in limiting the space for social 
consultations and cooperation between NGOs and authorities. Both in Hungary and Poland, 
key legislative changes were usually pushed at accelerated pace without any proper 
consultations with experts or stakeholders. The limited space for dialogue and consultations 
has several aspects including among others discrediting the position of NGOs and their role in 
the process of social consultations, tightening the schedule for social consultations and creating 
restrictions for NGOs in access to social consultations.44 With the development of the rule of 
law backsliding, NGOs have been gradually deprived of the possibility to effectively participate 
in social consultations. 
“Within last year we haven’t submitted any opinions to draft legislation. I think the entire 
process of social consultations has become a façade.” (S-PL-1) 
One of the reasons for that is that many of the key legal acts are presented as private members’ 
bills, so the requirement to organise mandatory social consultations is bypassed. For example 
in Poland, each act introducing consecutive reforms of the Constitutional Tribunal,45 the Act 
amending the Act on the Police46 and the Act on the Prosecutor’s Office47 were submitted to 
the Parliament as private bills of MPs. In the case of the Anti-terrorist Act, even though the 
government promised to launch a social consultation process, the draft was not consulted and, 
                                                     
44 See also: Fundamental Rights Agency, Challenges facing civil society organizations working on human rights in 
the EU, 2018. 
45 Polish Parliament (Sejm), Poselski projekt ustawy o zmianie ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym, druk nr 12, 
available at: http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=12, Poselski projekt ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
Trybunale Konstytucyjnym, druk nr 122, available at: http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=122, 
Poselski projekt ustawy o Trybunale Konstytucyjnym, druk nr 558, available at: 
http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=558, Poselski projekt ustawy o statusie sędziów Trybunału 
Konstytucyjnego, druk nr 880, available at: http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=880, Poselski 
projekt ustawy o organizacji i trybie postępowania przed Trybunałem Konstytucyjnym, druk nr 963, available at: 
http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=963, Poselski projekt ustawy - Przepisy wprowadzające ustawę 
o organizacji i trybie postępowania przed Trybunałem Konstytucyjnym oraz ustawę o statusie sędziów Trybunału 
Konstytucyjnego, druk nr 1059, available at: http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=1059. 
46 Polish Parliament (Sejm), Poselski projekt ustawy o zmianie ustawy o Policji oraz niektórych innych ustaw, druk 
nr 154, available at: http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=154.  
47 Polish Parliament (Sejm), Poselski projekt ustawy - Prawo o prokuraturze, druk nr 162 i druk nr 162-A, available 
at: http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=162.  
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which is even more worrying, remained confidential for a few months.48 The Civil Forum of 
Legislation stressed that between May and September 2016 very often the authorities 
responsible for organizing public consultations set very short deadlines for consultations (14 
days) and only the first version of the draft law was subject to consultations. Furthermore, the 
remarks received during the consultations were not always published and the responsible 
authorities almost never responded to the received remarks.49 
In Hungary, the key pieces of legislation were also adopted in a way leaving no or very little 
possibility for NGOs to intervene or present their opinions. According to the research carried 
out by the Corruption Research Center Budapest the average number of days in which the 
consultation was opened varied between 4 and 8 days in 2011-2014, and in the case of five bills 
the deadline for giving opinions was the same days as the day the bill appeared on the 
website.50 In this context, NGOs who tried to keep up with the pace of the Parliamentary works 
had to face the decision whether to continue their participation in the process.  
“We tried to respond to the wave of legislation initiatives by our opinions, reports and 
participation in the public consultations. The change came in 2013 when we all realized 
that Fidesz not only did not have any willingness to work with us, but also doesn’t want us 
to work at all.” (S-HU-3) 
At the same time, in Hungary there is a visible trend of weakening the institution of social 
consultations and distorting its nature. Since 2011, the Fidesz government has carried out four 
rounds of national consultations (two, the most famous ones were organized in 2017 under the 
titles “Stop Brussels” and “Stop Soros”). The nation-wide initiatives include questionnaires sent 
to eligible voters with manipulative questions on issues such as migration or international 
policies. The process of checking the results of the consultations seems also to be dubious - as 
the questionnaires are not a reliable tool and the consultations are not held in the formal 
framework of e.g. referendum (which would involve the requirement of more than 50% voter 
turnout) the final results may be interpreted according to the political will.51 In such a context 
– limiting access for civil society representatives to the consultations process and creating an 
illusionary framework for wide consultations – initiatives of national consultations give a false 
impression of factual involving citizens into decision making and serve only some specific 
political purposes.  
                                                     
48  Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, HFHR opinion on new antiterrorism law, available at: 
www.hfhr.pl/en/hfhr-opinion-on-new-antiterrorism-law/.  
49 Obywatelskie Forum Legislacji, Obserwacja praktyki procesu legislacyjnego w okresie od 16 maja do 10 września 
2016 r., available at: www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Odpowiedzialne%20Panstwo/ 
Komunikat%20z%20VIII%20obserwacji.pdf.  
50 Corruption Research Center Budapest, Impact Assessments Public Consultations and Legislation in Hungary 
2011-2014, available: http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/legislation_2014_report_150630.pdf.  
51  Hungarian Spectrum, National consultations, 2017: „Let’s stop Brussels!”, available at: 
http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/04/02/national-consultation-2017-lets-stop-brussels/.  
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Restrictions in access to funding 
The limitation of the NGOs’ operational space also has a more systemic aspect in the form of 
legal and policy changes severely affecting the works and the legal standing of NGOs. Both in 
Poland and Hungary, the governing majority adopted legislation affecting the process of 
financing NGOs. In Hungary, the issue of the financial standing of NGOs was widely discussed 
for at least three years when in 2014 the government initiated a campaign against the national 
operator of EEA/Norway grants, which resulted in a temporary suspension of the distribution 
of these funds. The state’s audit office controlled not only the operator of the grants, but also 
the NGOs which received funding from this source. The investigation in this case took over one 
year and was terminated on the basis of the lack of a committed criminal offence.52 However, 
this case was just a prelude to the adoption in 2017 of the so-called Lex NGO which imposed 
restrictions on NGOs which receive funds from abroad. The law requires certain NGOs receiving 
over 23,000 EUR per year (or to be precise: twice the amount of the sum determined by the 
Act LIII of 2017 in Anti-Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism) from abroad to register 
as an "organisations receiving support from abroad", display this label on their publications and 
websites and comply with numerous additional reporting obligations (including publishing the 
full list of NGOs’ donors, including individuals). The law severely hampers the work of NGOs. It 
undermines the NGOs’ credibility and may cause a chilling effect on any potential foreign 
donors.53 In its opinion, the Venice Commission stated that “while on paper certain provisions 
requiring transparency of foreign funding may appear to be in line with the standards, the 
context surrounding the adoption of the relevant law and specifically a virulent campaign by 
some state authorities against civil society organisations receiving foreign funding, portraying 
them as acting against the interests of society, may render such provisions problematic, raising 
a concern as to whether they breach the prohibition of discrimination, contrary to Article 14 
ECHR."54  
It seems, however, that the strategy of targeting particular NGOs has not been completed yet. 
In the beginning of 2018, the Hungarian government has presented draft legislation which, if 
adopted, would limit the work of foreign funded NGOs even further. The draft laws aim at 
stigmatizing not only NGOs (especially those helping „illegal migrants”), but also specific 
individuals. In the light of the draft laws, organizations that receive foreign funding and provide 
aid to migrants and refugees would be required to register at court and any foreign donation 
would be subjected to a 25% tax. If an NGO fails to meet these requirements, the legal 
                                                     
52  Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Timelines of governmental attacks against NGOs, available at: 
http://www.helsinki.hu/en/timeline-of-governmental-attacks-against-ngos/.  
53 Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Analysis of the Bill on foreign funded organisations (LEX NGO), available at: 
http://www.helsinki.hu/en/analysis-of-the-bill-on-foreign-funded-organisations-lexngo/.  
54  Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2017)015-e Hungary - Opinion on the Draft Law on the Transparency of 
Organisations receiving support from abroad, available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/ 
?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)015-e.  
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procedure against it would end in a fine of 200% of the foreign revenue or dissolution of the 
organization.55 
In Poland, the cuts in access to public funding have a more targeted approach. The government 
has limited access to public funds for certain NGOs, especially those dealing with migrants and 
refugees as well as helping victims of domestic violence. For example, in 2016, the Ministry of 
Interior announced that the call for proposals within the Asylum, Migration and Integration 
Fund was annulled. The Ministry explained its decision by stating that between the 
announcement of the call and presentation of its results significant changes had occurred in 
relation to migration and integration. Given that, the Ministry decided to announce two new 
calls for proposals. Altogether, the Ministry was supposed to distribute over 2,500,000 PLN 
(approx. 625,000 EUR).56 The deadline in those two calls was set for June 2016 and the costs 
were eligible as of August 2016.  
However, none of these calls have been resolved yet. This delay in resolving the calls has 
affected the NGOs’ capacity to provide legal aid and support to migrants and refugees,57 some 
of the NGOs have to significantly limit their work in this field. Furthermore, the government has 
also implemented policies targeting certain women’s rights organisations. In October 2017, 
when on the day before the anniversary of the Black Protest (a mass social mobilisation 
organised in 2016 against the draft law on a complete abortion ban) police raided offices of 
women’s rights organisations and collected their documentation and hardware. The police’s 
actions were related to an investigation concerning distributing funds from the Ministry of 
Justice’s Fund from which for years the organisations received support for their work for victims 
of domestic violence. However, after the change of the government in 2015, the organisations 
stopped receiving funds from this source and the Ministry’s negative decisions missed proper 
explanations (in some cases, the Ministry stated that since these organisations helped only 
women victims of domestic violence it may be discriminatory towards man). The police raid 
was part of a bigger trend of curbing the operations of women’s rights organizations.58 
                                                     
55 See further: Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Operation starve & strangle: how the government uses the law to 
repress Hungary’s civic spirit?, available at: https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/OPERATION-STARVE-
AND-STRANGLE-01022018.pdf.  
56 Ministry of Interior, Department of Boarder Policy and International Fund (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, 
Departament Polityki Granicznej i Funduszy Międzynarodowych), Dwa nowe nabory w ramach Funduszu Azylu, 
Migracji i Integracji, available at: http://fundusze.mswia.gov.pl/ue/aktualnosci/13784,Dwa-nowe-nabory-w-
ramach-Funduszu-Azylu-Migracji-i-Integracji.html.  
57 Mazur N., MSWiA ma miliony na integrację cudzoziemców, ale w 2016 r. nie wydało na to ani złotówki, Gazeta 
Wyborcza, available at: http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,21216958,mswia-ma-miliony-na-integracje-cudzoziemcow-
ale-w-2016-r-nie.html.  
58 Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Offices of women’s rights organisations searched by police – HFHR issues 
statement, available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/en/offices-of-womens-rights-organisations-searched-by-police-hfhr-
issues-statement/.  
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Also, in 2017, the Polish governing majority adopted the law changing the process of 
distributing public funds operated at the national level. The Act on the National Institute of 
Freedom creates a new administrative body which will work under the supervision of the 
government and without any meaningful participation of the civil society. The Institute 
distributes the national public funds for NGOs (at the beginning the Institute will operate the 
former Fund of Social Initiatives), however the law fails to provide any objective and open 
framework for organising the calls for proposals free from the Institute’s Director arbitrary and 
discretional power in decision making. Even more, the law leaves a possibility for the Director 
of the Institute to distribute upon his discretional decision certain part of Institute’s annual 
budget to NGOs for their institutional development.59 Eventually, the Institute will also be 
responsible for the distribution of EU funds operated at the national level. The lack of proper 
guarantees for transparency, equal treatment and participation of the civil society in this 
process raises concerns regarding the compliance of the provisions of this law with EU 
standards. 
The results of both the Hungarian Lex NGO and the Polish Act on the National Institute of 
Freedom most probably will soon be visible in practice by leading to significant changes in the 
process of financing NGOs, especially those smaller and working at the regional and local level 
whose scope of work is not in line with the governmental politics. Most probably, these two 
laws will further deepen the already existing discrepancies in the financial situation in the civil 
sector in both countries.60  
Similar, yet not the same 
Although in both countries the symptoms of the shrinking civil society space seem to be very 
similar, still there are some differences between the situation in these two countries especially 
when it comes to the scope and scale of certain deteriorating practices. First the most visible 
difference concerns the rhetoric used against NGOs. Smear campaigns against NGOs in Poland 
have not entered the phase as it is in Hungary right now. Although more and more often Polish 
NGOs have to face accusations of being “foreign agents” or “political rivals of the governing 
majority”, still these attacks have not taken such a systemic form as it happens in Hungary. So 
far, the approach towards certain NGOs differs in these two countries. While in Hungary the 
governing majority seems to be targeting very specific NGOs (these helping with migrants and 
refugees or advocating for the rule of law), in Poland the governing majority puts the main 
                                                     
59  Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, HFHR opinion on National Freedom Institute Bill, available at: 
http://www.hfhr.pl/en/hfhr-opinion-on-national-freedom-institute-bill/.  
60 See further on the difficulties in financing the civil sector in Hungary and Poland: Vandor Peter et al. (ed), Civil 
Society in Europe: Challenges and opportunities, Erste Stiftung, Vienna March 2017 and EU-Russia Civil Society 
Forum, Report on the state of civil society in the EU and Russia, available at: http://eu-russia-
csf.org/fileadmin/State_of_Civil_Society_Report/18_05_2017_RU-EU_Report_spaudai_Hyperlink_Spread.pdf.  
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pressure on dividing the civil society and marginalising the NGOs who are not in favour of the 
government.  
By supporting newly established NGOs who roots for the Law and Justice government as well 
as promoting the networks of right and conservative organisations, the Polish governing 
majority attempts to create a division between righteous NGOs (these newly or relatively newly 
established) and liberal NGOs (those who are presented as the organisations who monopolised 
the third sector).61 The attempts to deep the divisions between the NGOs may be inspired not 
only by the governing majority or supporting it media, but also by the organisations themselves. 
For example, in 2017 the conservative NGO Ordo Iuris published a report on the works of Stefan 
Batory Foundation as an operator of the Norwegian grants in Poland. Orod Iuris claimed that 
Batory Foundation’s model of operation the grants was biased, missed due diligence and 
favorited organisations from big cities, especially Warsaw. 62  In response to that, Batory 
Foundation presented data which showed that within the process of operation the grants 667 
NGOs were supported, and only 9% of all donated grants were carried out in Warsaw.63 
Another difference concerns the approach towards receiving foreign funding, especially this 
coming from the George Soros founded Open Society Foundation – one of the biggest donor 
organisation in the world. Although in Poland from the Open Society Foundation is used to 
discredit an NGO or its experts, the anti-Soros rhetoric has not been developed to an extent 
observed in Hungary. From the end of 2016, Fidesz government has been explicitly targeting 
Open Society Foundation and its grantees. For example, in 2017 Prime Minister Orban said that 
during this years NGOs funded by the OSF will be „squeezed out”64 while Fidesz’s spokeperson 
accused NGOs of conspiring with terrorist organizations and human traffickers in an “absurd 
coalition”.65  These are just two of many other similar examples showing the growth of the anti-
Soros rhetoric over the years which serves to Hungarian political purposes, but it also aims at 
undermining the position of NGOs and marginalise their position in the public sphere.  
Last but not least, the restrictions on access to financing for NGOs in Poland did not have a 
systemic form either (like e.g. Lex NGO adopted in Hungary in 2017), but had rather a form of 
decisions made by certain public authorities in cases concerning specific NGOs. However, soon 
this trend may evolve into more systemic strategy once the National Institute of Freedom starts 
its works. 
                                                     
61  See also: Ewa Kulik-Bielińska, Do czego prowadzą nas władze? Cel jest jasny, NGO.pl, available at: 
http://opinie.ngo.pl/wiadomosc/2125948.html.  
62  Ordo Iuris, Raport Ordo Iuris: Fundusze norweskie tylko dla wybranych, available at: 
http://www.ordoiuris.pl/wolnosci-obywatelskie/raport-ordo-iuris-fundusze-norweskie-tylko-dla-wybranych.  
63  Stefan Batory Foundation, Oświadczenie ws. fałszywych zarzutów Fundacji Ordo Iuris, available at: 
http://www.batory.org.pl/aktualnosci/oswiadczenie_ws_falszywych_zarzutow_fundacji_ordo_iuris.  
64 Civil Society Europe, Civil Society Europe briefing on the state of Civic Space and Fundamental Rights in Hungary, 
available at: https://euroalter.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CSE-Hungary-Fact-Sheet-Final.pdf.  
65 The Budapest Beacon, Kovács: NGOs conspiring with terrorist organizations and human traffickers, available at: 
https://budapestbeacon.com/kovacs-ngos-conspiring-terrorist-organizations-human-traffickers/.  
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The possible further developments 
These differences, however, do not change the fact that the process of democratic backsliding 
in these two countries has revealed a certain pattern when it comes to limiting the work and 
impact of NGOs. In both cases, the governments have introduced legal regulations or policies 
that influence the work of NGOs and limit their operational space. These changes may be of 
different nature – from legal changes affecting the regulatory framework of NGOs work 
through policies directly targeting certain NGOs to increasing obstacles for their work. 
Regardless their scope and nature, these changes always aim at limiting the role of certain 
NGOs, reducing the scope of their activity and undermining their position in the public life. 
Given the fact that both governments have already concentrated in their hands tools which 
allow them to deeply influence the civil society, the independence of the civil society sector will 
remain prone to further violations in the future.  
NGOs’ response to the rule of law backsliding  
NGOs’ reaction to the rule of law backsliding has changed over the time. At the initial stage, 
NGOs tried to respond to it in a way they worked in previous years among others by issuing 
statements, opinions, analyses and calling upon the governing majority to withdrew from the 
proposed changes.  
“We tried to respond to the wave of legislation initiatives by our opinions, reports and 
participation in the public consultations. The change came in 2013 when we all realized 
that Fidesz not only did not have any willingness to work with us, but also doesn’t want us 
to work at all.” (S-HU-3) 
“When the crisis started we were absolutely not prepared to respond to it – we didn’t have 
staff nor financial capacity. I also felt that our opinions and participation in the legislative 
process wouldn’t change anything. It took us some time to catch up with the pace of the 
works.” (S-PL-1) 
In both cases, Hungary and Poland, it took some time for NGOs to realize that the crisis they 
faced is actually a beginning of the long process which will affect the entire system of the state 
and in a consequence will change the environment of work in the third sector. With the 
development of the rule of law backsliding, it was also become obvious that certain NGOs as 
well as certain types of their activity (like e.g. strategic litigation at the international level or 
providing aid to migrants and refugees) would no longer fit into the new vision of the state. 
This vision includes the supremacy of the “voice of the people” (interpreted only as election 
results) over the rule of law and liberal values and leaves no space for organisations 
independent from the main governing center. NGOs which were the most active and prominent 
in the field of among others human rights protection and monitoring state’s action had to 
internalize that carrying out the same work and implementing the same methods of work may 
involve not only additional difficulties, but may jeopardies the development of their 
organization.   
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“We have realized that the government’s perception of NGOs has changed – if an NGO 
tries to do anything else than charity, e.g. advocacy or strategic litigation, then such an 
organization is not welcomed any more.” (S-HU-4)   
“When the crisis started, we all faced the same dilemma – either we’ll reshape the methods 
of our work and try to refocus in order to be more effective, or we’ll keep under the radar. 
Regardless, this if you pretend that nothing has changed, you’d actually worsen the 
situation of your organization.” (S-HU-2) 
The extensive scope of changes caused by the rule of law backsliding did not only influence the 
operational space for NGOs, but also forced them to rethink their methods of work and adjust 
to the new reality.  
New methods of work 
One of the direct consequences of undermining the independence of the judiciary in the 
process of the rule of law backsliding affected the NGOs capacity for strategic litigation and 
limiting or even closing some of the national avenues. For example in Poland, with the political 
take-over, the Constitutional Tribunal has lost its independence and the legitimacy of its work 
is no longer certain (see point 1). In 2017, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights issued a 
statement in which it said that in view of the lack of independence of the Constitutional Tribunal 
“the key role will be played by the jurisprudence of independent courts and international 
human rights protection bodies.”66 In this context, strategic litigation carried out by NGOs has 
also gained an additional goal in trying to prove the Constitutional Tribunal’s ineffectiveness in 
proceedings at the international level e.g. before the European Court of Human Rights. On the 
other hand, as one of the intervieweed activists stated, in Hungary, the international strategic 
litigation has provoked accusations that it is contrary to the best interest of the state and the 
NGOs who do litigate at this level are responsible for the fact that the Hungarian government 
has to pay significant compensations. 
“The strategic litigation is portrayed as if our organization was against Hungary.” (S-HU-2) 
Even more than before, NGOs in Hungary and Poland started joining their forces in 
documenting the actions undertaken by the governments and the violations of human rights 
and the rule of law. There are several purposes of these initiatives: from assessing the results 
of the implemented legal changes up to the documenting the scope of violations which may be 
important in the process of restoring safeguards of the rule of law.67 For example, in 2016 in 
Poland the group of civil society organizations created the “Citizens Observatory of Democracy” 
                                                     
66  Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Constitutional Tribunal: what next?, available at: 
http://www.hfhr.pl/en/constitutional-tribunal-what-next/.  
67 For example, Archiwum Osiatyńskiego, database of civil society analysis and opinions created in 2017, in its 
mission statement says „we register, describe and catalogue the chaos of rapid changes in the legal system and 
legal practice, violations of the Polish Constitution and lack of fulfillment Poland the international obligations which 
occurred since elections in 2015.” More information is available at: https://archiwumosiatynskiego.pl/debates-in-
english/.  
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– a database collecting opinions, reports and reactions of civil society organizations and other 
stakeholders to changes that affect civil rights and liberties, rule of law and the entire system 
of the state.68 In Hungary, for the last couple of years four organizations – Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Transparency International Hungary and Eötvös 
Károly Policy Institute are documenting violations of rule law and attacks on civil society 
sector.69 
NGOs which used to work focusing on their field of expertise started to unite and build multi-
disciplinary networks and coalitions. For example, in July 2017, Polish NGOs started to build a 
coalition calling for joining the protests against the planned reform of the judiciary – the call 
was supported by a wide range of NGOs of different backgrounds. These calls were repeated 
in November 2017 when NGOs joined forces in a wide coalition protesting against the new 
proposal for judiciary reform.70 Also, in Hungary there is a visible trend of forming wide trans-
sectional coalitions of NGOs. Drawing lessons from previous mobilizations, since 2017 
Hungarian NGOs started forming an informal, working coalition whose aim is to tighten the 
cooperation between organizations.71 
Also, most probably for the first time in the history of their work, Hungarian NGOs faced the 
necessity to deliberately not to comply with binding provisions as an act of civil disobedience. 
In 2017, 14 Hungarian NGOs decided not to follow the provisions of the newly adopted Lex 
NGO and not to register as “foreign agents” until this law is reviewed and approved by the 
Constitutional Tribunal and the European Court of Human Rights.72   The civil disobedience is 
also used by certain Polish NGOs, especially Citizens of Poland Foundation, who protest against 
the changes introduced to the Act on assemblies in 2017. These changes granted a priority to 
so-called “periodic assemblies”. The status of a “periodic assembly” is granted by the part of 
the government administration in the regions and can be granted to an assembly which aim is 
to among others commemorate an important event from the Polish history. If an assembly is 
granted this status none of others assemblies can be organized near to it. This institution was 
created to grant the priority to assembly organized by Law and Justice and their supporters 
assemblies in Warsaw organized on every 10 of each month to commemorate the air crash of 
Presidential plane in Smoleńsk in 2010. Regardless these restrictions and lack of the possibility 
                                                     
68 See: Citizens Observatory of Democracy, available at: http://citizensobservatory.pl/.  
69 See: Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Analyses and positions, available at: https://www.helsinki.hu/en/rule-of-
law/analysis-positions/.  
70 Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Free courts!, available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/en/free-courts/.  
71 Stefánia Kapronczay, War on NGOs in Eastern Europe, International Journal on Human Rights, issue 26, available 
at: http://sur.conectas.org/en/war-on-ngos-in-eastern-europe/.  
72  Hungarian Helsinki Committee, We will not register as foreign-funded organization, available at: 
https://www.helsinki.hu/en/we_will_not_register/.  
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to register their own assembly, the activists of the Citizens of Poland organize counter-
demonstrations on each 10 day of the month.73  
Strengthening the “old” methods of work 
While developing the new methods of work by NGOs seemed to be rather a response to the 
rule of law backsliding, then strengthening the traditional methods of work is rather a response 
to a parallel process of shrinking civil society space.  
NGOs remaining under constant attack from either the governing majority or public media have 
had to develop and enhance both their communication and fundraising skills. The interviewed 
activists admitted that the on-going crisis has forced their organizations to focus more on the 
way they communicate and to start working more with their constituencies. Also, the lack of 
certainty as to funding has led the majority of the interviewed activists to develop strategy of 
direct fundraising. For example, in both countries the mechanism of 1% tax refund is available 
and in the recent years some organizations who managed to survive constant attacks and 
increasing pressure noted a trend of growing donation via 1% tax refund mechanism.74 As some 
of the interviewees admitted, the increase in the might also be a consequence of the smear 
campaigns run by the public media, as more people have learnt about the existence and work 
of the NGOs in general. It is not possible, however, to recognize the trend of growing private 
donations as unequivocally positive. For Hungarian and Polish NGOs lack of sustainable funding 
and limiting access to public funds remains one of the biggest challenges in their activity. As 
both the Hungarian and Polish NGOs relay strongly on the access to public funds75 (either 
distributed by central or local administration) any change in the policies of distributing these 
financial resources may deeply change the landscape of the civil sector.  
Furthermore, due to the lack of available methods for advocacy at the national level, the NGOs 
from both countries have become more active at the EU and Council of Europe level. Many 
NGOs have had such experiences before, but in their cases it usually referred to the situation 
in other countries (such as the countries of the former Soviet block). Only after the rule of law 
crises reached their countries, the NGOs developed the work in this direction.  
“Prior to 2010 we didn’t run any sort of international advocacy. However, after 2010 we 
have intensified our cooperation with the European Commission, DGs and the European 
                                                     
73 Bartosz Kocejko, Obywatelskie nieposłuszeństwo w Polsce Kaczyńskiego, Błaszczaka i Ziobry. Czy da się obronić 
w sądzie?, Oko.press, available at: https://oko.press/obywatelskie-nieposluszenstwo-polsce-kaczynskiego-
blaszczaka-ziobry-da-sie-obronic-sadzie/.  
74 For example: Átlátszó, Despite anti-NGO smear campaign by the government, Átlátszóincreases number of 
supporters, available at: https://english.atlatszo.hu/2017/09/18/despite-anti-ngo-smear-campaign-by-the-
government-atlatszo-increases-number-of-supporters/.  
75 EU-Russia Civil Society Forum, Report on the state of civil society in the EU and Russia, available at: http://eu-
russia-csf.org/fileadmin/State_of_Civil_Society_Report/18_05_2017_RU-
EU_Report_spaudai_Hyperlink_Spread.pdf.  
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Parliament. We also tried to participate in the on-going monitoring mechanisms run by the 
Council of Europe or the UN.” (S-HU-3) 
Results 
The rule of law backsliding which involved the piling difficulties for NGOs to operate has 
deepened the disproportions in the civil society sector even further. For small NGOs acting at 
the regional or local level, the problems with access to public funds has resulted in significant 
limitation of their works.76 On the other hand, the relatively big national NGOs had to invest a 
lion share of their resources in developing the methods of work. Although it may seem that the 
rule of law backsliding has forced relative strengthening of some part of certain NGOs’ work 
capacity, it also remains a fact that the work under such circumstances severely overburdens 
NGOs. The staff of many watchdog organizations face the risk of burnout and, in the most 
severe cases (in which NGOs deal with particularly debated issues such as helping migrants and 
refugees or other minorities), also of personal attacks.  
Furthermore, responding to the on-going rule of law backsliding process also involves setting 
new priorities for NGOs, which have to combine both their regular work (such e.g. providing 
legal aid, monitoring or educations) and monitoring the legal and policy changes concerning 
the system of the state. Also, NGOs have to face the challenge of reclaiming the sphere in the 
public discussion. Both in Poland and Hungary, the political discourse has become more 
aggressive and populistic, which excludes any possibility for substantial discussions concerning 
the issues such as the rule of law or human rights. Another hindering aspect is that old, 
traditional NGOs are replaced in the discussion by relatively new NGOs which affirm the policies 
introduced by the government and manifest their support. These groups are usually portrayed 
as “real NGOs” protecting the real interest of the state.77  
“What we have been recently observing is the artificial polarization of the NGOs. In the 
government’s rhetoric the so-called leftist and liberal groups are confronted with the right 
and conservative groups. It causes an impression that the civil society should reflect the 
same polarization which is in the politics.” (S-PL-2) 
 
 
                                                     
76 See further e.g. Warso Z., Godzisz P. Bychawska-Siniarska D., Information on challenges faced by human rights 
defenders and civil society in Poland, November 2016, available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/HRD-report-30112016-FIN.pdf or Aleksandra Szyłło, Już nie pomożemy ofiarom 
przemocy domowej. Centrum Praw Kobiet znów bez pieniędzy, Gazeta Wyborcza, avaialble at: 
http://wyborcza.pl/duzyformat/7,127290,21448198,juz-nie-pomozemy-ofiarom-przemocy-domowej-centrum-
praw.html.  
77 These organisations are also known as GONGO organisations. This term means can be described as government 
organized or non-governmental organisations which are set up or sponsored by a government to further its 
political interests and mimic the civic groups, see further: Hungarian Spectrum, Fidesz's very own "NGOs" stuffed 
with public money, available at: http://hungarianspectrum.org/tag/gongo/.  
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Rule of law backsliding and shrinking space for NGOs – civil society’s response – selected examples 
Symptom Example Civil society’s reaction Possible outcomes 
Limiting operational 
space (as a result of rule 
of law backsliding) 
Poland: changes in the 
functioning of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, 
lack of legal certainty of 
its decisions 
Quitting the litigation 
before the Constitutional 
Tribunal 
Intensifying the strategic 
litigation before 
international courts 
Judgment of the 
European Court of 
Human Rights proving 
the Constitutional 
Tribunal as non-effective 
remedy 
Limiting operational 
space (as a result of 
shrinking civil society 
space) 
Hungary: attacks on 
NGOs 
Building multi-
disciplinary coalitions 
and networks 
Improving the 
cooperation within the 
third sector, enhancing 
the mass mobilization 
Possible emerging new 
social movements 
Limiting space for 
dialogue (as a result of 
shrinking civil society 
space) 
Poland: lack of proper 
social consultations 
Creating new databases 
of expert information 
Aggravating the 
information on the scope 
and scale of rule of law 
backsliding, creating a 
documentation of the 
crisis which may serve as 
a ground for restoring of 
rule of law safeguards 
Restrictions in access to 
funding 
Hungary: Lex NGO Complying with the law 
or civil disobedience 
Challenging the law 
before the Constitutional 
Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights  
Depending on the court’s 
decision 
 
Last but not least, all the interviewed civil society activists admit that the governments of two 
countries are not yet done with the process of creating a new civil society and that further 
restrictions may still be on the way. The interviewed activists shared the same fear of further 
legal actions that may target specific organizations (among others starting the long process of 
audits or tax controls, initiation of criminal proceedings) which will hinder the condition of the 
entire civic sector and diminish the standards of cooperation with the civil society organizations 
for many years to come.  
“My biggest fear is that after one or two terms of office of this government in power, we’ll 
see a massive exodus of civil society organizations. People won’t be working within civil 
society and others won’t want to work with civil society organizations. We’ll eventually let 
it go instead of continuing our work. By doing so, we’ll let the politicians be stupid.”  
(S-PL-1) 
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Recommendations 
The rule of law backsliding has effected the standing and works of national NGOs which have 
become the subject of attacks, smear campaigns and which are being deprived of their regular 
methods and tools of work.  
In order to counter the negative effects, the European Union institutions have to recognize the 
problems occurring in certain aspects of the shrinking civil society space and apply dedicated 
solutions.  
In general, in order to prevent the spreading of the process of the shrinking civil society space: 
 The European Union should provide a mechanism for monitoring the situation in the civil 
society and its operational space as the freedom of operation of the civil society is the key 
element of a democratic state. 
In terms of countering the limiting space for dialogue at the national level: 
 European Commission should accelerate the works on the establishment of a 
comprehensive Union mechanism for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.78 
As it is stated in point 10 of the European Parliament Report on Rule of Law, this mechanism 
should include civil society in the monitoring process as well as should include civic 
participation in the process of reviewing the protection of democracy, rule of law and 
fundamental rights in the Member States.  
 European Commission should develop a mechanism for civil society organizations in 
providing additional information concerning violations of the rule of law or fundamental 
freedoms. 79 Such a mechanism could reflect the already established process of shadow 
reporting used in the UN Treaty bodies. 
In terms of countering the restrictions in access to funding for NGOs: 
 The European Union should adopt a new financial mechanism designed to provide financial 
support for civil society organizations working for human rights protection, rule of law and 
democracy. The fund should be operated independently of national authorities and its 
managing should take into consideration the hostile environment in which some of the 
NGOs work (like e.g. in Hungary). The fund should be dedicated to cover costs related to 
                                                     
78 European Parliament, Report 10 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment 
of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2016-
0283+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=cs.  
79 See also: Sergio Carrera, Julius Rostas and Lina Vosyliūtė, “Combating Institutional Anti-Gypsyism. Responses 
and promising practices in the EU and selected Member States”, CEPS, 2017/08, available at: 
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/RR2017-08_AntiGypsyism.pdf.  
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these types of activity which are usually blocked or hampered by the rule of law backsliding 
such as monitoring, advocacy or strategic litigation.80  
 European Commission and European Parliament should ensure that civil society actors are 
meaningfully involved in the works of the steering and monitoring committees supervising 
the distribution of the EU funds at the national level.  
 European Commission should closely monitor the process of recently adopted acts 
changing the distribution of public funds (Poland) and access to foreign funding (Hungary).  
 
                                                     
80 This idea was firstly published by Israel Butler, “Participatory democracy under threat: growing restrictions on 
the freedoms of NGOs in the EU”, Civil Liberties Union for Europ, available at: 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_W-Vna2eVNVOFk5VXUzeE9CdGM/view and Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, “A 
normative crisis. The need to protect democratic values in Europe”, Batory Foundation, available at: 
http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/rap_otw_eu/A%20normative%20crisis_Batory%20Foundation%2009
_2017.pdf.  
  
The CEPS Engage Fellowship Programme 
CEPS launched the ENGAGE Fellowship Programme with the support of the Open Society 
Initiative for Europe (OSIFE). This tailor-made Programme connects academic, civil society and 
think tank actors from Central and Eastern European and Western Balkans countries with EU-
level policy debates. It consists of a one-year programme providing a set of trainings, study 
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of the selected fellows in the 2018 CEPS Ideas Lab. 
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